

Mexico Violent Crime Report

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
- This report, the 11th in a series of Mexico security-related assessments, contains analysis and forecasts of how organised crime trends affect the operating environment in Mexico based on intelligence extending to 31 January 2021.
 - Data are drawn from IHS Markit's Mexico Violent Crime Monitor, an intelligence analysis project that aggregates key violent crime indicators related to Mexico's security environment from official sources, media, social media, and local human sources.
 - This intelligence is integrated into our Mexico Violent Crime Model, a geospatial layer that differentiates the relative risk of violent crime to operators in Mexico at a high spatial resolution.
 - Previous versions of this report can be found in the links below:
 - > [Tenth Edition \(September 2020\)](#)
 - > [Ninth Edition \(May 2020\)](#)
 - > [Eighth Edition \(December 2019\)](#)
 - > [Seventh Edition \(July 2019\)](#)
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There were 34,515 homicide victims nationwide in 2020, a 0.4% decrease compared with 2019

Homicide victims averaged 2,876.25 per month in 2020. March 2020 had the highest number of victims (3,042) in 2020. The annual homicide rate ended at 27.01 per 100,000 in 2020, a 1.32% decrease compared with 2019.

- > In January 2021, there was a 7.77% month-on-month (m/m) increase in recorded homicide incidents to 2,831, up from 2,627 in December 2020. The top homicide hotspots were **Guanajuato**, **Baja California**, and **Jalisco**.
- > Homicides continue to be driven by organised crime-related disputes related to the control of drug-trafficking routes, drug selling at the street level, and the control of extortion, cargo, and hydrocarbons theft zones. Gang or cartel members are typically the main targets, but security forces members, police, civilians, or communities can become targets or collateral casualties when caught between rival cartels during shootouts.
- > **Guanajuato** continued to record the greatest number of homicides nationwide with 4,490 recorded incidents, a 27% increase since 2019. Authorities estimate that 80% of incidents in this state are linked to organised crime. The states with the greatest total number of homicides after **Guanajuato** included **Baja California** (2,906), **Estado de México** (2,793), and **Chihuahua** (2,686).
- > Homicides increased in 11 states across Mexico in 2020, including by 68% in **Zacatecas** (1,065), by 64% in **Yucatán** (54), and by 48% in **San Luis Potosí** (732). Around 30% of homicides nationally were concentrated in only 15 municipalities including Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Leon, Acapulco, Culiacan, Guadalajara, and Cajeme.

Reported homicides in Mexico by month, with quarterly trend line



Homicides by weapons type, 2020

70.65%
Firearm

21.32%
Unspecified


8.04%
Blunt weapon

Source: National Public Security System (SENSP)

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
Guanajuato and Baja California were Q4 hotspots; Caborca, Sonora, had the highest three-month murder rate (323.9 victims per 100,000)

Mexico: Crime Risks, 2020



Now available on Connect: IHS Markit's Crime Risk location scoring model geographically differentiates crime risks across all on-land locations globally. Our methodology integrates subject matter expertise, best-in-class data sources, and cutting-edge geospatial modelling into a standardised comparative risk framework that enables customers to measure and compare risk across exposure their entire global footprint.

Reported homicides in Mexico, October–December 2020



The homicide rate in Caborca, Sonora, increased rapidly in the quarter because former Guadalajara Cartel leader Rafael Caro Quintero, allied with Sinaloa Cartel factions, has expanded the Caborca Cartel to increase marijuana crop production and control drug-trafficking corridors to the United States.


Source: IHS Markit with data from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and National Public Security System (SENSP)

Annual total of homicides classed as femicides rose by 135% in the past five years to 969 recorded incidents in 2020, increasing insecurity for women

In order to be classed as a femicide, officials must have a reasonable indication that the homicide of a woman was committed in a context of discrimination and gender violence, typically accompanied by, but not limited to, torture, mutilation, and sexual violence.

- > There were 969 femicide victims recorded over 2020, with an average of 80.75 per month, one more than during the same 12-month period in 2019. When added to the 2,783 homicide victims, a total 3,723 women were killed in 2020.
- > **Estado de México** recorded the greatest number of femicides nationwide with 151 recorded incidents. Municipalities with the greatest number of incidents included Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua (19) and Tijuana, Baja California (18). In 2020, the majority of cases were reported to have taken place in public spaces (56%) with a firearm (57%).
- > Nationally, there were 16,543 reported incidents of sexual assault and violation for victims of all genders reported in 2020, a 4.54% decrease from 2019, largely because of the COVID-19-virus pandemic-related movement restrictions. **Estado de México** (1,949) concentrated 11.7% of all incidents of rape followed by **Mexico City** (1,505). In Q4 2020, Mexico City districts with the highest level of confrontations or sexual violence in public spaces included Cuauhtémoc (36.6%) and Gustavo A. Madero (34.2%). The tourist hotspot of **Quintana Roo** (36.8 per 100,000) reported the highest incidence rate.
- > In **Mexico City**, gender-related crimes are highest in Centro, Doctores, Agrícola Pantitlán, and Roma neighbourhoods with perceptions of insecurity highest in Iztapalapa (82.8%) and Alvaro Obregon (84.7%), according to the Q4 2020 INEGI Urban Public Security survey. Perceptions of insecurity in Mexican urban centres tend to be about 10% higher for women than for men.

Homicides of women classed as femicides in Mexico, 2015–20



Issues affecting specific travellers in Guadalajara as featured in IHS Markit's City Crime Reports

- > Femicides are concentrated in the municipalities of El Salto, Guadalajara, and Tlajomulco de Zúñiga; Chula Vista, Lomas del Mirador, and Santa Fe.
- > A 2018 United Nations study found that over 75% of female residents in Guadalajara's Metropolitan Area (MAG) experienced harassment on public streets and 58% feel insecure on public transport, with women less likely than men to receive support from security personnel when reporting a crime.
- > Foreigners are not directly targeted but can face similar rates of violence and harassment.
- > After the police force arrested 201 people over harassment charges from January to July 2020, authorities rolled out the Pulso de Vida anti-harassment campaign, deploying 631 panic buttons in Guadalajara and Zapopan.
- > Although LGBTQiA individuals are at risk of assault, the threat is lower in the MAG than in other parts of the country. IHS Markit sources indicate that police frequently treat the murder of LGBTQiA individuals as common homicides rather than hate crimes despite evidence to the contrary, indicating continuing prejudice against this type of crime in the MAG.

Select events in Connect:

- **29 January 2021:** Police arrested the leader of an extortion cell targeting LGBTQiA individuals in Guadalajara through social networks to meet in public spaces before threatening them.
- **18 January 2021:** Jalisco governor Enrique Alfaro said during a press conference that from 2018 to 2020, robberies fell by 41.1% in Guadalajara, including to bystanders by 42.1%.

IHS Markit city-level crime scores	
Total score	3.4
Death and injury	3.8
Kidnap	3.0
Extortion	3.4
Robbery	3.8

Low 0.1–0.7	Moderate 0.8–1.5	Elevated 1.6–2.3	High 2.4–3.1	Very high 3.2–4.3	Severe 4.4–6.4	Extreme 6.5–10.0
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[Access Guadalajara Crime Report – Last Update December 2020](#)

Protests over gender-related violence set to intensify in 2021 as femicides, sexual assaults, and abuse increase, and impunity remains over 97%

The organisation Brujas del Mar, under the hashtag #UnDiaSinNosotras, organised a 24-hour national women's strike on 9 March 2020 that served as a catalyst for activist groups against gender-based violence in 2020 and that is likely to continue to gather momentum over the next year.

- > A series of high-profile murders between October 2020 and February 2021, including in **Estado de México, Chiapas**, tourism hotspot **Quintana Roo**, and **Yucatán**, have resulted in solidarity marches across Mexico and in Mexico City.
- > Continuing impunity for femicides and sexual assaults, as well as a perceived lack of government response, particularly continued apathy from President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), are fuelling security-related protest risks in Mexico City and, to a lesser extent, state capitals for 2021.
- > Between November 2020 and February 2021 protests over an escalation of gender-based violence including sexual assaults and femicides in tourist hotspot Cancun, **Quintana Roo**, have mobilised up to 1,000 individuals at a time as well as simultaneous demonstrations in neighbouring municipalities of Solidaridad, Playa del Carmen, Puerto Felipe Carrillo, and Chetumal.
- > The organisation Causa en Comun claims that **Quintana Roo** has significantly under-reported gender-based crimes since June 2020 as an effort by authorities to limit negative publicity in the tourist-heavy state. Perceptions of insecurity among residents of the state increased from 81.5% of those polled to 88.1% from September to December 2020, according to the National Survey of Urban Public Safety (ENSU).
- > Protests in **Mexico City** have included occasional violent confrontations between police and protesters with police firing live rounds into the air and using teargas against protesters throwing non-lethal projectiles and spray-painting police materials. Related damages included widespread graffiti on buildings along protest routes as well as the burning of street furniture and destruction of common areas in local government buildings.
- > Opportunistic looting of retail outlets is a moderate risk in protest hotspots.




A demonstration against police violence and justice for the femicide of Bianca Alejandrina Lorenzana Alvarado, also known as Alexis, in Cancun, was held in the surroundings of the representation of the government of Quintana Roo state. Cristian Leyva/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

Kidnapping incidents have been falling nationwide, particularly in Sonora and Quintana Roo states

Reported kidnappings decreased year on year (y/y) by 36%, with 1,032 reported victims nationwide in 2020.

- > Over 2020, few or no kidnapping incidents were reported in **Yucatán**, **Durango**, **Campeche**, and **Nayarit**, contributing to the downward trend observed across the country.
- > Kidnapping incidents remained highest in **Estado de México** (188 incidents) and **Veracruz** (137 incidents), while states with the highest kidnapping rates per 100,000 included **Morelos** (2.9 per 100,000) and **Zacatecas** (2.2 per 100,000).
- > **Sinaloa** (11 incidents) recorded the greatest percentage y/y increase in kidnappings in 2020, with 83% in 2019.
- > The National Anti-kidnapping Co-ordination (Coordinación Nacional Antisecuestro: CONASE) reported that 2,604 alleged kidnappers were detained between 16 July 2019 and 30 December 2020, while 1,155 victims were released over the 18-month period.
- > Although not recorded independently of kidnapping or extortion crimes, **virtual kidnapping** incidents have increased during 2020, according to police statements, and are likely to continue their upward trend as a low-input, low-risk alternative to traditional kidnapping methods in the 12-month outlook.
- > Reported kidnapping incidents decreased by 28.36% in January 2021 to 48, down from 67 in December 2020. Top hotspots included **Estado de México** (11 incidents) and **Veracruz** (6 incidents).


Reported kidnapping incidents in Mexico, 2015–20



Source: National Public Security System (SENSP)

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Percentage change in reported kidnapping incidents in Mexico, 2019–20



Source: National Public Security System (SENSP)

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Selected kidnapping incidents featured on IHS Markit's Connect

- **31 January 2021:** In Granjas de México neighbourhood, Mexico City, a woman and her son escaped from an Uber driver who tried to kidnap them when they entered the taxicab; the victims posted SOS messages on Twitter, leading to their rescue.
- **27 January 2021:** In Durango, Durango state, police forces raided a hotel located on Francisco Villa boulevard, rescuing a couple who were victims of a virtual kidnapping. The victims said they were called by alleged organised crime members and forced to isolate, subsequently calling their relatives to demand a ransom.
- **26 January 2021:** In Iztapalapa, Mexico City, police forces arrested two police officers involved in the kidnapping of a man, for which they demanded a USD30,000 ransom from his relatives.
- **21 January 2021:** In Xalapa, Veracruz state, police forces exchanged gunfire with a local gang who shortly before kidnapped a victim, killing five aggressors; officers also raided a house on Teseschoacán street and rescued six kidnapped victims unharmed.
- **13 January 2021:** In San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec, Veracruz state, police forces exchanged gunfire near the Presidential Palace with armed individuals who shortly before kidnapped a man, arresting two and rescuing the victim.
- **30 November 2020:** In Polanco neighbourhood, Miguel Hidalgo district, Mexico City, dozens of local residents peacefully marched to protest after the kidnapping and murder of a French national who owned a local restaurant.

Select crime events in Connect for Mexico, January 2021




Source: IHS Markit
Underlying base map provided by Google Maps. © 2021 IHS Markit. All rights reserved. Provided "as is", without any warranty. This map is not to be reproduced or disseminated and is not to be used or cited as evidence in connection with any territorial claim. IHS Markit did not create the underlying map visual and is impartial and not an authority on international boundaries, which might be subject to unresolved claims by multiple jurisdictions.

Estado de México, Jalisco, and Veracruz states reported over half of all recorded extortion incidents in 2020


The number of officially recorded extortion incidents nationwide reached 8,378 in 2020, falling by 7% from the 9,003 recorded in the same period a year earlier.

- > The federal entities with the most reported incidents were **Estado de México** (3,152), **Jalisco** (763), and **Veracruz** (722), representing 55.35% of all reported extortion cases.
- > Of those reporting more than 250 cases of extortion in 2020, those with the greatest percentage increase were **Estado de México** (27%), **Queretaro** (11%), and **Zacatecas** (8%) while states with the greatest decreases were **Ciudad de México** (-59%) and **Nuevo León** (-24%).
- > The number of companies reporting at least one extortion demand against their businesses increased to 688 businesses per 100,000 in 2019, up from 544 businesses per 100,000 in 2017, according to the 2020 National Survey of Companies' Victimization (ENVE).
- > Actual numbers are likely to be much higher because of significant and persistent under-reporting. The 2020 ENVE report found that 98.7% of extortion incidents targeting businesses were not reported in 2019.
- > Extortion targets also differ by state. In **Estado de México**, extortion charges have resulted in cost increases for construction materials as cargo carriers pass on extortion fees to clients. Construction companies also pay land access quotas to local criminal groups, resulting in extortion-related cost increases on multiple fronts.

Reported extortion incidents in Mexico, 2015–20



States in Mexico with over 250 reported cases of extortion, 2020



Extortion spotlight: Mexico's avocado industry to face increasing extortion, arson, and theft risks in 2021 amid rising export demand

Risks of extortion and arson for avocado producers will increase in 2021 as US demand for Mexican avocados continues to grow and criminal groups seek to diversify their income amid declining drug sales revenue since the outbreak of the COVID-19-virus pandemic.

- > There was 12% growth in US demand for Mexican avocados in the second half of 2020, for a total 551,226 tonnes of avocados exported over the six-month period. This is projected by the Producers and Packers/Exporters of Avocado of Mexico (APEAM) to reach 1.17 million in exports over the July 2020–June 2021 growing season.
- > Increased production and export of avocados is incentivising criminal groups to gain control of avocado production processes and transport routes in **Michoacán**, **Guerrero**, **Morelos**, and **Puebla**.
- > Risks are highest in **Michoacán**, which accounts for around 80% of all avocados produced nationally, and where state security authorities have said that the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación: CJNG) is disputing control of production and transport routes with local groups, including Camaleón and La Nueva Familia Michoacana.
- > On 17 December, two avocado packing plants were set on fire by armed groups in Tinguindín and Peribán, Michoacán, reportedly following threats for extortion payments; while another packing plant was destroyed by fire at the Zitácuaro Industrial park on 2 January 2021, also in Michoacán.
- > Greater penetration by criminal groups into the avocado industry would increase counter-party risks for US companies engaging with local Mexican suppliers.
- > Theft risks for avocado cargo are also rising across all producing states this year, as well as for other high-value agricultural export products like walnuts in **Chihuahua** state.



An employee works at an avocado packaging plant in the municipality of Uruapan, Michoacan state, Mexico. Ronaldo Schemidt/AFP via Getty Images

Selected extortion incidents featured on IHS Markit's Connect

- **28 January 2021:** A new extortion modus operandi targeting companies in which perpetrators threatened to publish private company data extracted from databases was highlighted by the Institute of Transparency and Access to Public Information (INAI).
- **21 January 2021:** In Polanco neighbourhood, Miguel Hidalgo district, Mexico City, police forces arrested two officers from the Prosecutor's Office of Mexico City (FGJ-CDM) between Masaryk and Moliere streets on extortion charges.
- **13 January 2021:** In Chihuahua, Chihuahua state, the State Prosecutor's Office warned of a new extortion modus operandi in which perpetrators collect information from individuals shopping for vehicles via social networks, calling them and demanding monetary payments.
- **17 December 2020:** On the Los Reyes-Jocona motorway near San Ignacio, Tingüindín, Michoacán state, individuals with tactical uniforms and assault rifles set on fire an avocado packing plant owned by Green Sportt after the owners refused to pay extortion fees; no arrests were reported.
- **1 December 2020:** The National Guard in Jalisco reported it was investigating a video in which National Guard personnel appeared to be demanding extortion payments from an illegal business.
- **12 November 2020:** In Acapulco, Guerrero, Services, Commerce and Tourism Federation (Federación de Cámaras de Comercio, Servicio y Turismo: FENACO) revealed that 28 small businesses had closed operations due to high levels of extortion, urging the authorities to strengthen security in the city.
- **11 November 2020:** Chicken traders in Valle de Toluca, Estado de México, reported a new extortion modality where criminals were coercing them to buy the most expensive product from a single supplier.




View of a hotel that was abandoned after receiving threats of extortion in China, Nuevo León state, on 22 November 2019. Julio Cesar Aguilar/AFP via Getty Images

Cargo theft risks to rise in 2021 if industrial productivity continues to recover with Estado de México, Michoacán, and Puebla most likely to be affected

Road and rail cargo theft incidents declined nationally in 2020. Road theft incidents fell to 9,521 in 2020 from 11,662 in 2019, while rail theft incidents were down to 581 in the third quarter of 2020 from 1,102 in the third quarter of 2019. This is partly because of reduced volumes of cargo in transit due to the COVID-19-virus pandemic.

- > **Puebla** state recorded the greatest decline in road theft alongside the successful C4 Immediate Response Centre operation implemented in early 2020. The operation's effective implementation elsewhere (planned for 12 more states in 2021) would be likely to reduce incidents if accompanied by adequate security force deployment and technology.
- > Cargo remains attractive to criminal groups as a means of revenue diversification. Many criminal groups are currently reorganising because of fragmentation and COVID-19-virus-related disruption to their traditional drug- and extortion-related income. This increases the attractiveness of cargo theft as an alternative.
- > The most targeted goods on roads include white goods, auto parts, electronic items, construction materials, food and beverages, medicines, and chemicals. Rail cargo incidents in 2020 occurred mainly in **Jalisco, Coahuila, and Sonora**, targeting mainly automotive parts (30%), consumer goods (19%), and grains/seeds (18%).
- > Overall, road and rail theft incidents are likely to increase in 2021 as US and domestic demand for Mexican products recovers, leading to higher cargo volumes in transit. This will depend on industrial operations continuing without significant new restrictions or stoppages.


Reported road cargo theft incidents in worst-affected Mexican states: 2019–20



Rail cargo theft and derailments likely to increase throughout Mexico in 2021 despite incidents decreasing in 2020

Criminal groups throughout Mexico are currently reorganising because of COVID-19-virus-related disruption affecting their income generated via drug trafficking and extortion.

- > In combination with the fragmentation of some organised crime groups caused by the capture or killing of their leaders, reorganisation has forced these groups into diversifying revenue streams by focusing on activities other than drug trafficking such as rail and road cargo theft. Criminal groups, sometimes working alongside willing or coerced local communities or corrupt law enforcement authorities, often cut or block railways across Mexico to derail or stop freight trains and steal cargo.
- > Official statistics show a declining trend in rail cargo theft incidents (590 in fourth-quarter 2020 vs 941 fourth-quarter 2019), but the likelihood that these thefts, and associated derailments, will increase in 2021 is high.
- > Security forces' inability to provide security to Mexico's entire rail network will also continue to leave the sector vulnerable to theft and sabotage incidents in 2021.
- > The most affected type of cargo includes chemicals, iron, steel, medicines, electronic devices, automotive parts, construction material, and grains.
- > Top hotspots include **Jalisco, Coahuila, Estado de México, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Tlaxcala, Puebla, and Sonora** states. The resumption of economic activity in Mexico and its main export market, the US, as demand for products increases following the lifting of COVID-19-virus-related restrictions in 2021, is likely to lead to higher volumes of goods being transported by rail, further incentivising criminal groups into targeting the sector.




Key incident: A freight train loaded with an undisclosed number of vehicles derailed on 30 December after gunmen attempting to steal its cargo cut about 2 m of Ferrosur company's railway tracks in El Mezquite, Acultzingo municipality, **Veracruz**, Mexico. The incident took place at about 3 am local time and damaged 11 wagons carrying Europe-bound vehicles.

Narco-messages threatening rivals, as well as civilians, give an indication of developing turf-war hotspots

Narco-messages posted on bridges or alongside bodies of victims threaten rivals, government authorities, and citizens throughout Mexico. Most emerged in Baja California, Colima, Quintana Roo, and Zacatecas states during October 2020 and February 2021. Narco-videos posted on social media also continued to increase in frequency.


- **4 February 2021:** Alleged CJNG members released a video on social media threatening the mayor of Taxco, Guerrero, along with members of his cabinet.
- **29 January 2021:** In Mariano Matamoros neighbourhood, Tijuana, Baja California, a narco-message threatening the state attorney-general was found attached to a suitcase with human remains.
- **12 December 2020:** In Juanchorrey, Zacatecas, police forces found the dismembered body of the director of the Municipal Police, Armando Cuevas Rocha, near a local road with a narco-message signed by the CJNG attached to it. The officer had been kidnapped on 5 December 2020.
- **10 December 2020:** On 71 street, 91 neighbourhood, Cancun, Quintana Roo, police forces found a narco-message threatening the commander of Yucatán's state police, Flores Moo, and other local commanders.
- **13 October 2020:** In Xalapa, Veracruz state, an unidentified criminal group posted a narco-banner near the Prosecutor's Office of the State (FGE) headquarters threatening the prosecutor Francisco Hernández and accusing him of not complying with agreements, on which he did not comment.



Status of military, marine, and National Guard security operations

There were 186,179 army, navy, and National Guard personnel deployed to end-2020.

- > The National Defence Secretariate (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional: SEDENA) maintains 84,847 operational personnel, and the Marine Secretariate (Secretaría de Marina: SEMAR), 31,200. The National Guard had 98,285 personnel operational. Of these operational personnel across the three institutions, a total of 88% were actively deployed to domestic operations at the end of 2020.
- > There were 2,429 personnel assigned to anti-hydrocarbon theft operations, concentrated in **Estado de México, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Michoacán, and Tamaulipas**, including eight priority pipelines in Mexico's central belt covering a total 1,467 km.
- > PEMEX refineries and distribution centres accounted for almost half (98 of 225) of all strategic installations covered by 7,506 personnel in 2020. Others included electricity stations and infrastructure (56) and customs processing offices (44).
- > By the end of 2020, there were 22 completed National Guard facilities from which 5,225 personnel were operating in Michoacán to counter high homicide rates, hydrocarbon theft, drug trafficking, and extortion affecting avocado growers.
- > The number of staff assigned to migration management has decreased from about 27,000 to 8,058 in the last year. Most personnel are concentrated in **Baja California, Chiapas, Chihuahua, and Tabasco**. Migration flows are expected to swell in 2021, increasing demands on migration-specific security forces.



Mexico Security Strategy: Aviation Risks limited to security forces helicopters supporting ground forces at low altitudes (1 of 2)

Property damage risks are present nationwide but are particularly high in Michoacán, Guerrero, Jalisco, Nayarit, Colima, Durango, Sinaloa, Zacatecas, Morelos, Estado de México, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas states.

- > Criminal organisations have fired .50-calibre machine guns at military helicopters, damaging the helicopters' armour, cabin and sometimes the rotor systems, and forcing emergency landings.
- > They have the financial strength to acquire rocket-propelled grenades and have used them against security forces' helicopters in the past, bringing down one Cougar EC725 helicopter in Jalisco in 2015.
- > National Guard, SEDENA, and state and municipal police helicopters are likely to continue supporting ground forces in 2021, meaning that property damage and shoot-down risks are likely to persist.
- > Criminals and poppy planting communities also use steel wires near illegal crops to take down helicopters flying at very low altitudes during counter-narcotics operations.



Soldiers in a Mexican Air Force Blackhawk helicopter fly over the Mexican state of Guanajuato on 4 February 2019 during an operation to fight illegal taps on Pemex's oil and gas pipelines. Pedro PARDO / AFP / Getty Images

Mexico Security Strategy: At least 46 military helicopters have crashed during counter-narcotics operations since 2006 (2 of 2)

Official SEDENA figures highlight that since 2006:

- > Nine military helicopters have been brought down as a result of a direct armed attack by criminal organisations in Oaxaca, Durango, Jalisco, Sinaloa, and Guerrero states.
- > Twenty-two military helicopters crashed during counter-narcotics operations due to human error in Baja California Sur, Estado de México, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Sonora, Sinaloa, Michoacán, Durango, and Guerrero states.
- > Ten military helicopters crashed due to mechanical failures during counter-narcotics operations in Tamaulipas, Michoacán, Guerrero, Quintana Roo, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Chiapas, and Durango states.
- > Five military helicopters crashed due to other reasons during counter-narcotics operations, including weather conditions, in Oaxaca, Guerrero, Sonora, Campeche, and Baja California states.

Select events in Connect:

- **8 December 2020:** In Villa Hermosa rural area, Jerez, Zacatecas state, gunmen opened fire at a military helicopter during an anti-kidnapping operation.
- **7 December 2020:** In Miacatlán, Morelos state, gunmen opened fire at a Bell 206 helicopter during a car chase, injuring an officer during the cross-fire.



A .50 high-power sniper rifle seized from Los Zetas criminal organisation in June 2020.
Getty Images/AFP

US-Mexico security relationship weakening after DEA arrest of Mexican General Salvador Cienfuegos (ret'd)

The arrest of Mexico's former national defence secretary, Salvador Cienfuegos, by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in October 2020 on drugs-trafficking and money-laundering charges at Los Angeles international airport served as a catalyst to magnify fissures within the US-Mexico intelligence-sharing relationship that are likely to hurt bilateral intelligence networks and weaken security force capacities to counter cartel activities in 2021.

- > Cienfuegos, who has denied all allegations, was charged for accepting bribes from a branch of the Beltrán Leyva organisation to allow drug shipments to the US and in passing investigation information to criminal organisations. He is the highest-ranking Mexican official ever to be charged in relation to drug-trafficking activities.
- > The resulting diplomatic dispute between the US and Mexico led to Cienfuegos's repatriation to Mexico on assurances he would be investigated. In January 2021, Mexico's Attorney-General's office announced that it would not be proceeding against Cienfuegos.
- > The DEA arrest – without first warning Mexico or sharing related intelligence – put AMLO in a position between ensuring a continuing positive relationship with his armed forces that had been angered by Cienfuegos's arrest and pursuing the case against him as part of his anti-corruption drive.
- > AMLO's subsequent statement in January 2021 alleging that the DEA had fabricated drug-trafficking charges against Cienfuegos, as well as his public release of the associated evidence file provided by the DEA, represents a breach of intelligence confidence between the two countries that is likely to weaken future intelligence -sharing.
- > US President Joe Biden has avoided the issue in bilateral talks, but the subject is likely to re-emerge during security-related negotiations in the coming months. If the US reinitiated Cienfuegos's prosecution following his exoneration in Mexico, the move likely would provoke further deterioration in the bilateral relationship in 2021.



Former US secretary of defense James Mattis (L) participates in an enhanced honour cordon to welcome Gen. Cienfuegos (C), and Mexican Secretary of the Navy Admiral Vidal Francisco Soberon Sanz (R) to the Pentagon on 22 May 2017 in Arlington, Virginia. Alex Wong/Getty Images

Weakening the US-Mexico security relationship: Mexico's National Security Law reform

In reaction to Gen. Cienfuegos's arrest, AMLO introduced in December 2020 changes to the National Security Law, eliminating immunity status for foreign agents accused of committing crimes. The law also imposed limits on foreign agents' contact with local officials in Mexico.

- > Under the changes, foreign agent meetings and contacts with individuals on Mexican territory must be reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. AMLO has argued that the changes are necessary to regulate the activities of foreign intelligence agents in Mexico.
- > Weakened intelligence-sharing trust over the Cienfuegos arrest combined with the National Security Law changes are likely to slightly reduce human intelligence (humint) gathering performed by foreign agencies. This is likely to promote a shift into more electronic monitoring (signals intelligence; sigint) that was not included under the National Security Law changes.
- > This is likely to weaken Mexico's access to foreign intelligence through direct communication exchanges without a corresponding increased benefit from foreign sigint collections. Impacts to Mexico's security operations include the loss of the DEA's contributions in countering CJNG activities and the freezing of cartel bank accounts, as well as SEMAR collaborations in the Gulf of Mexico (see **Mexico: 14 December 2020: [Mexico's proposed security legislation to weaken US-bilateral anti-cartel efforts, likely increasing armed attacks in Jalisco and Guanajuato](#)**).
- > AMLO's emphasis on the importance of sovereign agency in his first official communication to President Biden is a further indication that co-operation on security issues including drug trafficking, intelligence sharing, and security force training will encounter roadblocks over 2021. Engagement with US Ambassador Roberta Jacobson, with significant knowledge on bilateral co-operation to combat organised crime, on security would be a positive indicator.
- > Institutional efforts to rebuild bilateral security operations and intelligence-gathering functions are likely to encounter further political opposition after 12 elite US-trained Mexican police officers were implicated in the massacre of 19 individuals in Tamaulipas in January 2021. Mexican political officials are likely to use such incidents to push for greater distance and a shift in focus in the US-Mexico Mérida Initiative.



Then-US Vice-President Joe Biden (L) shakes hands with then-presidential candidate for the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) Andrés Manuel López Obrador (R), during a meeting on 5 March 2012 in Mexico City. Yuri Cortez/AFP via Getty Images

Strengthening the US-Mexico security relationship: Co-operation on Central America migration flows

An opening for bilateral security co-operation is likely to be the consensus between Presidents Biden and AMLO on a development aid and jobs investment approach to Central American migration flows in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

- > AMLO is pursuing Biden's commitment of USD4 billion to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for economic development as evidence of their bilateral alignment on how to address the root causes of migration.
- > Positive reception in Mexico of Biden's cancellation of the Remain in Mexico programme, through which an estimated 6,000 migrants had to wait in Mexico during their US asylum application process, is likely to open dialogue possibilities. Passage of Biden's immigration reforms to regularise 11 million undocumented migrants and engagement of Mexican ambassador Esteban Moctezuma on anti-weapons trafficking initiatives to slow weapons entry to Mexico is likely to further soften AMLO towards greater collaboration on migration prevention issues.
- > The budget for the US-Mexico Mérida Initiative financing military aid and training has been decreasing steadily in recent years, with a 60% y/y decrease in 2020 to USD69.3 million from 2019. Since 2019, AMLO has proposed replacing the Initiative with a jobs-creation package. If the US opens up negotiations on a shift in direction for Mérida Initiative funds towards economic and job stimulus initiatives as an alternative or prevention-led approach to improving security and reducing migration, this likely will indicate further improvement in the Mexico-US working relationship between the two presidents.
- > If migration numbers from Central America increase over 2021, AMLO's capacity and inclination to slow migrants and turn them back to their countries of origin will act as a barometer of his openness to work with the US, setting the tone for other bilateral discussions including on the expansion of joint security operations.



New anti-money laundering powers for the Fiscal Intelligence Unit to improve investigative capabilities; illicit transactions remain a high risk for contracts

On 18 November, Mexico's Senate approved legislation allowing the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) to block bank accounts involved linked to individuals under investigation for money laundering or the financing of terrorism, without first receiving a court order to speed anti-money laundering (AML) enforcement processes.

- > Those eligible to be blocked during AML investigations will be decided based on an internal UIF list or on the recommendations of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP). Implicated entities have 10 business days to challenge the freezing of accounts. All financial transactions for the individual or entity also would be suspended for up to 15 days duration of the investigation, after which the UIF must issue a decision on whether the freeze remains in place.
- > Changes were implemented to AML legislation by the SHCP in December 2020, allowing the Treasury to monitor more closely the use of electronic payments and platforms as well as cryptocurrencies through the request of data and information on individuals performing electronic transactions to ensure they are compliant with AML measures.
- > The additional AML tools have been implemented in the context of the 2020–24 AML Strategy launched in September 2020 by UIF head Santiago Nieto, who noted that there were 19 high-impact criminal organisations operating in Mexico seeking to launder profits that reached USD50 billion over a 24-month period in 2016–18. The 2020 Basel AML Index ranked Mexico 68 out of 141 countries.

Case study: Cancun, Quintana Roo

The UIF announced on 4 February that it had blocked 79 banking accounts linked to a criminal group cloning tourist bank cards in the tourism hotspot.

- > The UIF analysed over USD278.84 million in transactions.
- > Individuals involved were primarily from Mexico and Romania operating in Cancun, Riviera Nayarita, Los Cabos, and Puerto Vallarta.
- > Criminals altered ATM functions in tourist hotels to steal bank card data, withdraw funds, and then launder proceeds through front companies according to the UIF.

Case study: Puebla

The UIF announced on 26 January that it had frozen 26,068 bank accounts over 33 months linked with individuals and legal entities on the List of Blocked Persons (LPB) for money laundering activities or financing of terrorist activities.

- > The actions between January 2018 and September 2020 involved accounts totalling MXN5.441 billion and USD333.7 million. There were 800 bank operations confiscated in 2018, 12,080 in 2019, and 13,188 in 2020.
- > Local experts indicated that the circulation of laundered capital in Puebla was as high as 25% of all transactions in 2020.

Freezing financial transactions of criminal groups increasingly common in Mexico but reputational and operational risks remain for companies

UIF actions against cartel finances

March 2020	Organised crime	Nieto disclosed that the UIF had blocked 12,000 bank accounts involving MXN4.5 billion and USD52 million linked to organised crime groups involved in drug-trafficking, hydrocarbon theft, and illegal financial transactions.
March 2020	Sinaloa Cartel	As a result of a joint UIF-US DEA investigation, the UIF blocked 14 bank accounts linked to nine individuals and five companies associated with the Sinaloa Cartel. An additional four bank accounts linked to alleged drug trafficker Rafael Caro Quintero also were targeted. More than USD70 million in financial institutions located in Jalisco , Culiacan, Sinaloa , and Delaware , US, was confiscated.
June 2020	CJNG	Under Operation 'Agave Azul' conducted in Jalisco, Guanajuato, Nuevo Leon, Colima, Veracruz, Estado de México, Michoacán , and Baja California states, the UIF blocked about 2,000 accounts connected with 1,770 individuals and 167 legal entities with alleged links to the CJNG. More than USD133 million in funds were frozen and USD3 million seized during the operations.
August 2020	Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (CSRL)	The UIF announced that it had blocked 11 bank accounts related to the legal and accounting activities of CSRL leader "El Marro". This was added to the existing 43 accounts blocked in 2020 linked to 88 individuals and 56 legal entities with CSRL connections.
January 2021	La Familia Michoacana	The UIF stated that between December 2018 and November 2020, it had suspended 3,575 bank accounts linked to the La Familia Michoacana.

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For a map of blacklisted companies in Mexico, please see Mexico Violent Crime Report: [Tenth Edition \(September 2020\)](#)

Sectors at risk of money laundering in Mexico, according to the UIF

Purchase and sales of vehicles Loans and credit Land title transfers	HIGH RISK
Lottery and gambling Service and credit cards Metals, stones, jewellery, watches Works of art	MEDIUM RISK
Religious donations and tithes Property leasing Pre-paid gift cards Transfer and custody of securities Professional services Shielding services	LOW-MEDIUM RISK

Source: UIF

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Armed robbery incidents in southern Gulf of Mexico likely to target oil platforms and transportation, seeking high-value equipment and materials


The Gersemi oil platform operated by Borr Drilling, located 9.5 km from the Dos Bocas port in Tabasco, had equipment stolen by two armed men on 21 December 2020, highlighting a common modality for targeting platforms and vessels for theft in the Gulf of Mexico.

- > Mexico's merchant navy reported that there were more than 200 theft incidents on oil vessels and platforms in 2019, up from 140 in 2018 and 49 in 2017. The escalation followed the 2013 reforms allowing investor-owned companies to purchase exploration and production rights from the Mexican state leading to the rapid expansion of small and medium-sized drilling vessels in the southern Gulf of Mexico.
- > To counter the rise in crime, SEMAR launched operation 'Refuerzo Sonda' in May 2020 with around 4,580 personnel. The National Maritime Authority reported in November that the operation had reduced maritime robbery incidents in Tabasco and Campeche to zero.
- > US Office of Naval Intelligence reports contradict SEMAR's reports, documenting at least 13 incidents occurring in **Tabasco**, **Veracruz**, and **Campeche** from April to December 2020.
- > Robberies in this area are typically perpetrated by groups of between five and 15 armed individuals using fishing boats to board vessels and platforms, stealing equipment, materials, and belongings from crew. Weapons used include firearms, machetes, or knives.
- > The allocation of SEMAR personnel to port administration and customs operations at ports from September 2020, as well as their involvement in the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine, means that SEMAR resources are likely to be overstretched in 2021, reducing capacity to counter anti-robbery-at-sea operations effectively and raising the probability of new incidents through the rest of 2021.



Offshore drilling rig next to a production platform in Gulf of Mexico, 13 March 2012. Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

Maritime armed robbery incidents in southern Gulf of Mexico: April to December 2020



Theft of pharmaceutical products and medical supplies likely to continue to rise in 2021

Theft of pharmaceutical products and medical supplies like oxygen are highly likely to be targeted for theft during the first half of 2021, because of limited supplies, high criminal group capacity and intent to target medical products, and Mexico's thriving online black market.

- > Supply-chain intelligence firm Sensitech reported that the theft of pharmaceutical products accounted for 5% of total cargo theft in the third quarter of 2020, up from 3% in the second quarter. Shipments of medicines and medical equipment for which there are extended shortages are at a high risk of armed robbery (for example those connected with COVID-19-virus, cancer, or HIV treatments), while in transit and within storage facilities or at dispensing points such as pharmacies. During the influenza (flu) vaccine shortages in Mexico in October 2020, an armed group stole 10,100 doses in **Estado de México**.
- > Armed robbery risks are higher for vaccines stored at normal refrigerated temperatures and from locations such as hospitals and health centres, which are less likely to have military protection. These risks also extend to any vaccine- or COVID-19-virus-related equipment in short supply, particularly oxygen tanks. Corrupt healthcare and social security officials are also likely to sell vaccines or equipment to criminal groups, with medicine theft by workers at the Institute of Social Security (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social: IMSS) estimated to be worth USD5.3 million from 2013 to 2019 (see **LAT AM: 5 January 2021: [COVID-19 vaccines in Latin America](#)**).

Intelligence events: Pharmaceutical theft incidents in Mexico since October 2020

4 October 2020	In Iztapalapa, Mexico City, around 15 armed individuals with seven vehicles stole 37,000 units of children's oncological medicine from a storage facility after taking workers hostage.
12 October 2020	In Nezahualcóyotl, Estado de México, 10,100 doses of influenza vaccine belonging to IMSS were stolen from a lorry.
13 October 2020	In Cuauhtémoc, Mexico City, an armed group boarded and stole a lorry loaded with dialysis equipment after forcing the driver to leave the vehicle.
24 December 2020	In Gustavo A Madero, Mexico City, police detained five members of "Los Chalecos" gang accused of theft of a lorry loaded with 32,800 boxes of iron deficiency treatment Fisiofer worth USD83,000.
19 January 2021	In Navojoa, Sonora, an armed individual entered a hospital and stole seven tanks of oxygen intended for use for COVID-19 patients.
19 January 2021	In Coalco, Estado de México, two armed individuals stole a truck loaded with more than 40 oxygen tanks intended for use for COVID-19 patients.
19 January 2021	In Tlaltenango, Cuernavaca, Morelos, four COVID-19 vaccines were stolen from a public hospital; a statement from social security institute (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado: ISSSTE) said that the perpetrator was likely to be part of the hospital's vaccination team.

Spotlight on Mexico City


Security summary

At least five cartels operate in Mexico City: CJNG, Sinaloa Cartel, Cártel Nueva Generación Tepito, Cártel de Tláhuac, and the Unión Tepito.

The CJNG moved into Mexico City in 2020, operating in Benito Juárez, Miguel Hidalgo, Gustavo A. Madero, Cuauhtémoc, Tlalpan, Xochimilco, Milpa Alta, and Cuajimalpa districts and is expanding into Azcapotzalco in 2021. It has formed an alliance with the Fuerza-Anti Unión de Tepito to challenge La Unión de Tepito territory, which is likely to continue to drive cartel-related deaths, particularly in the city centre where La Union controls robberies and retail extortion.

The greatest number of homicides in the fourth quarter of 2020 were concentrated in Venustiano Carranza, Iztacalco, Tlahuac, and Miguel Hidalgo. The greatest number of drug seizures in January–February 2021 were in Miguel Hidalgo, Tlalpan, Nezahualcoyotl, and Benito Juárez.


Although most crimes decreased in 2020, in part because of the pandemic, including an almost 70% decrease in kidnappings, common crime risks perpetrated mostly by local gangs remain a business operations risk including muggings, car robberies, armed robbery targeting cargo or facilities, as well as extortion.



[For detailed analysis, click on: Probability of CJNG cartel conducting armed attacks against government buildings and officials in Mexico rises](#)

New in Foresight Security Planning: Global Security Incident Trends

Security incidents in Mexico City captured by the new Global Security Incident Dashboard



Source: IHS Markit

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Route analysis: Ciudad de México to Veracruz Risk Profile (1 of 2)

IHS Markit risk assessment capabilities include route analysis like this Ciudad de Mexico-Veracruz security risk profile.

Mexican Transportation Alliance (Alianza Mexicana de Organizaciones de Transportistas) and National Road Cargo Chamber (Camara Nacional del Autotransporte de Carga: CANACAR) have reported Maltrata, as well as Cordoba, Orizaba and Amozoc as high-risk areas.

- > During rush hours, cars are usually stuck in traffic jam at the tollbooth near Texmelucan (Puebla), increasing theft and kidnapping risks, particularly at night.
- > Cargo theft risks are high near Texmelucan city.
- > Risks are lower as drivers approach the Arco de Seguridad police station on the Texmelucan-Puebla road section near Huejotzingo.
- > There have been reports of armed robberies and cargo theft on Viaducto Elevado de Puebla. Crime groups operate in the zone, particularly at night targeting cargo or travellers.
- > Stopping in rest areas nearby the Amozoc tollbooth increases armed robbery risks.
- > Acatzingo and Tecamachalco pose high cargo theft risks. There have been also reports of drivers robbed by individuals posing a police patrols.
- > Maltrata (or Cumbres de Maltrata) to Cordoba highway is the highest risk section of this route, particularly the road section on the Puebla-Cordoba highway.
- > Truck drivers, unions, and police constantly report about violent assaults on this road, particularly near Maltrata, Orizaba and Cordoba.

Ciudad de México to Veracruz Risk Profile



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 Underlying base map provided by Google Maps.
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Route analysis: Ciudad de México to Veracruz Risk Profile (2 of 2)

In February 2021, AMOTAC's head in Tehuacan, Gabriel Femat, claimed that an undisclosed number of companies have begun to hire private security firms to protect lorries from cargo theft along the Puebla-Orizaba motorway.

- > Mobile phone and GPS signal are limited on this road section, particularly near Cumbres de Maltrata.
- > Travelling from rom La Tinaja to Veracruz port at night increases theft and kidnapping risks.
- > Sources on the ground have reported isolated cases of travellers assaulted by fake police patrols on this road section.

Risk Profile Calculation

All Security


Political Violence

	Mean	Max	Min	SD
All Security	3.60	5.18	2.57	0.64
Civil Unrest	2.95	4.64	2.00	0.73
Crime	7.01	9.90	4.28	1.12
Terrorism	1.77	2.26	1.74	0.12
War	0.98	1.44	0.67	0.32

Copy to Clipboard

Updated on 13 Feb 2021

Ciudad de México to Veracruz Risk Calculator in Connect



Spotlight on Ciudad Juárez


Security summary

The Sinaloa Cartel and Juárez Cartel allied with Los Artistas Asesinos gang are challenging the CJNG and La Linea along with gang allies Los Mexicles and Los Aztecas for control of the city.

Ciudad Juárez is a strategic crossing point to the US of which local and transnational cartels fight for control. They also are competing for retail drug sales in the city.

About 60% of homicides in the state took place in Ciudad Juárez where homicides increased by 8% in 2020 over the previous year to 1,642 recorded incidents. Co-ordination between state and federal security forces is likely to be hindered by political disagreements between Governor Javier Corral Jurado and AMLO.


Risks to businesses include armed robberies, with 88 cases recorded in November–December 2020, and extortion. Although there are no official extortion figures, enforcement of extortion through the burning of vehicles or shooting of employees is a moderate risk.



[For detailed analysis, click on: Turf wars involving Los Mexicles, Aztecas, and Nueva Empresa gangs lead to rising homicides in Mexico's Ciudad Juárez](#)

New in Foresight Security Planning: Global Security Incident Trends

Security incidents in Ciudad Juárez captured by the new Global Security Incident Dashboard





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Spotlight on Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua: Overall trends and emerging hotspots



Spotlight on Tijuana

Security summary


Three main cartels are operating in the city:

CJNG, Sinaloa Cartel, and the Tijuana Cartel/Arrellano Felix along with the smaller Tijuana Cartel New Generation (CTNG) and Los Chapitos. There is also an estimated 2,500 gang members running drug sales.

Tijuana is a strategic crossing for drug trafficking, connecting with the US. CJNG is engaged in a territorial dispute with Los Chapitos, responsible for an escalation in homicides since January 2021.

The greatest number of crime-related homicides in January 2021 include the districts of Centenario, Otay, Sanchez Taboada, Los Pinos, and Florido-Mariano. A clandestine gravesite in Maclovio Rojas neighbourhood and a suitcase left at the State Prosecutor's Office on 29 January 2021 with a narco-message are likely indications that cartel violence is likely to intensify in the next quarter.


Extortion, kidnapping, and robberies are the main risks for companies and employees in Tijuana. Collateral injury during shooting incidents between police and criminal organisation members in public spaces remain a moderate risk for bystanders.



[For detailed analysis, click on: COVID-19-virus spread likely to weaken Mexican drug cartels' revenue streams while accelerating fragmentation process and turf wars](#)

New in Foresight Security Planning: Global Security Incident Trends

Security incidents in Tijuana captured by the new Global Security Incident Dashboard





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Spotlight on Tijuana, Baja California: Overall trends and emerging hotspots



Hotspots to watch through May 2021

1

Guanajuato

- Narco-messages and associated violent crimes including homicides and shooting incidents in public spaces are likely to intensify during 2021 as the CJNG continues to expand its presence in Guanajuato, challenging the CSRL for territorial control. Blockades, vehicles set on fire, and armed robberies are likely to affect cargo transport on the Leon-Irapuato-Salamanca-Celaya corridor through 2021. Fuel theft and extortion targeting the oil sector are also likely to escalate through the year which, combined with high levels of cargo insecurity, will be among the main security challenges for businesses operating in the state.

2

Zacatecas

- Zacatecas is a strategic state for drug trafficking as it connects the US with Guerrero, Michoacán, Jalisco, and the Port of Manzanillo in Colima. Armed confrontations, narco-messages, and homicides in Jerez, Fresnillo, Guadalupe, and Zacatecas are likely the result of competition over the trafficking corridor between the Gulf Cartel, the Cartel del Noreste, the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG, and Los Talibanes. Violent confrontations are most likely along Zacatecas-Reynosa-Nuevo Laredo corridor. Criminal groups also are likely to continue targeting the mining sector, Zacatecas's most important industry, causing extensive property damage and increasing kidnapping, injury, and death risks for mining employees, particularly in the municipality of Fresnillo.

3

Puebla-Veracruz

- The Puebla-Veracruz corridor, connecting Puebla to the Port of Veracruz, is increasingly likely to become a turf-war hotspot as up to 30 gangs compete for access to train cargo shipments near the municipalities of Texmelecuan, Amozoc, Orizaba, Cordoba, and Xalapa. Entire communities are increasingly turning to train theft and vandalism, targeting consumer goods and auto parts. On 31 December 2020, perpetrators derailed a train of 11 wagons containing Volkswagen vehicles near Acultzingo, causing extensive damages to the railroad infrastructure and millions in losses.

4

San Luis Potosi

- Violence is likely to intensify in the next quarter as the CJNG continues to fight the Gulf Cartel remnants, Los Talibanes and the Northeast cartel for the control of the main drug-trafficking corridors connecting to Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, including Matehuala, Rioverde, Salinas, and the state's capital, increasing violent shooting incidents.

Foresight security planning – Key analysis on Latin America

Select Headline analysis:

- > [RISK NOTE: Argentina's gang violence presents increased risk of extortion, collateral death and injury risk in Rosario](#)
- > [Looting and government-property damage risks increase moderately in Peru with new lockdown and presidential election approaching](#)
- > [Rising criminal activity in Colombia's Catatumbo region to exacerbate hydrocarbon infrastructure damage, targeting of police installations](#)
- > [Governing party's win in next election to reduce security-related disputes in El Salvador, downward-trending crime rate continuation likely](#)
- > [Expansion of militia groups in Brazil's metropolitan areas increases extortion risks for large international companies, particularly telecommunications](#)
- > [Colombia's Bogotá records rise in gang-linked homicides, most likely to remain concentrated outside main business districts](#)
- > [Supreme Court's ruling against SOE measures likely to degrade Jamaican government's capability to counter violent crime](#)
- > [Organised crime in Costa Rica to increase, benefiting from smuggled weapons, diversified revenue streams, and police overstretch](#)


Latest city crime profiles:

[City Crime Report: Monterrey](#)

[City Crime Report: Guadalajara](#)

[City Crime Report: Caracas](#)


[City Crime Report: São Paulo](#)



New Foresight Security Planning Feature: Global Crime Risk Layer

IHS Markit's Crime Risk location scoring model provides a quantified view of crime risks globally and enables security and risk management teams to rapidly analyse risk exposure across their organisational footprint, however large or complex. The key features of the model are as follows:

- > Structured expert insight of the Country Risk team into crime risk dynamics is integrated with a wide array of public domain data sources on crime and proxy indicators. The combination of these inputs through geospatial modelling produces location risk scores that are forward-looking, globally comparative, and differentiated at the sub-national level.
 - > Scores are generated at 500×500 m resolution for the entirety of the earth's land surface.
 - > Scores are recalculated once a month. This ensures that the model responds rapidly to any indicators of change and to the publication of new or updated data sources.



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